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1. FRENCH FEAR DELAY IN REACHING AGREED POSITION WEAKENS WEST IN ARMS TALKS

A high-ranking French Foreign Ministry official expressed apprehension on 14 August that time was running out in the London disarmament talks because of the delay in presenting a complete agreed Western position. He said a member of the French disarmament delegation received the impression during a 13 August

meeting with Zorin that the Soviet delegate might be preparing to pull out and throw the disarmament discussion into the UN General Assembly.

The French official fears that the report of the Disarmament Subcommittee will reach the General Assembly reflecting the simple, reasonable-sounding Soviet proposals not refuted by any agreed Western position. Paris thinks that if such agreement cannot be obtained quickly, the Western delegations should put together a generalized resumé of their main positions which would not touch on details still at issue among them.

The official did not indicate any belief that US reservations stemmed from West German pressure--an accusation which Jules Moch has twice repeated to the American delegate. Soviet delegate Zorin's 13 August statement that West Germany has a "veto" over all Western disarmament proposals was characterized by Moch as significant.

2. LONG-RANGE PLANS LACKING FOR PACIFICATION OF OMAN




Neither the Sultan of Muscat nor the local British authorities in the Persian Gulf appear to have long-range plans for pacification of Oman or consolidation of the Sultan's restored authority over the

Omani villages, according to the American consul general in Dhahran. Although the Sultan has sent his minister of interior to Oman to attempt to cultivate tribal support for the Sultan and determine the whereabouts of the rebel leaders, he apparently has no further plans for developing loyalties in Oman.

The British political resident for the Persian Gulf, who has just returned from a visit to Muscat, was unable to say whether the Sultan's forces, with or without the Trucial Scouts, would be able to maintain order in Oman. He said Britain had no plans to improve the effectiveness and reliability of the Sultan's forces. While admitting that such assistance would be useful, he indicated that Britain would probably be unwilling or unable to provide a subsidy. For the time being, however, one company of British troops will remain in Oman.

Future revenues from the new American oil discovery in Dhofar Province are evidently counted on to enable the Sultan to win the interior tribes with bribes and development programs. The British official commented that if the Sultan could disburse \$700,000 annually, it would "make all the difference." The consul general comments, however, that unless the oil company is willing to make advances against future revenues, sufficient sums may not materialize soon enough.



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4. SUKARNO REPORTED CONTEMPLATING MAJOR CHANGES IN JAVA ARMY COMMAND

25X1 [redacted] President Sukarno is contemplating major army command changes which would affect Army Chief of Staff General Nasution and some of his deputies,

25X1 [redacted] Sukarno is said to be keeping his choices to replace them a closely guarded secret. It is not known whether the three territorial commanders in Java would be affected. [redacted]

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Comment

Sukarno may well be impatient with the lack of progress by army headquarters in enforcing its authority over the disaffected provincial commanders. Army headquarters officers are generally anti-Communist and some of them reportedly have opposed Sukarno in his efforts to implement his concept of guided democracy. Sukarno undoubtedly is under Communist and leftist pressure to effect command changes in the army.

He is also under pressure from the provincial commanders to remove Nasution, and he may feel that a general reshuffle, replacing present officers with a new group representative of all army factions, including the leftists, would help army unity. Such a reshuffle, however, would undoubtedly give the Communists more influence and for the time being would probably intensify rather than decrease army disunity.

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